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 Luther on necessity 
 Knut Alfsvåg, School of Mission and Theology, Stavanger, Norway 
 
 
Everything happens with absolute necessity 
 
Among the quotations from Luther’s works condemned by the pope in 1520 was the 
statement that free will is something that exists in name only.
1
 In his defence of this statement 
in Assertio omnium articulorum, published in December 1520, Luther goes one step further. 
Here he does not only declare “free will” to be a concept without factual reference,2 he insists 
that there is not anybody who is in the position even to think on one’s own, either good or 
bad, as everything happens with absolute necessity.
3
   
 As a defence of the rejection of free will, this is certainly a strong argument. But both 
friend and foe have since been wondering if Luther is not overshooting his target here. Even 
if one were to admit that free will may be a problematic concept, does its rejection 
necessarily imply a defence of the idea that everything happens with absolute necessity? Is 
not this idea rather at variance both with the basic tenets of the Christian faith and with the 
otherwise generally non-determinist flavour of Luther’s thought? Why does Luther in 
Assertio make himself dependent on the undoubtedly controversial and potentially 
inconsistent idea that everything happens by absolute necessity? 
 Luther does not always frame his answer to the question of free will in these terms. 
When he translated Assertio omnium articulorum  into German and published it as Grund 
und Ursach aller Artikel in March 1521, his defence of the rejection of free will did not 
                                                 
1
“Liberum arbitrium post peccatum res est de solo titulo, et dum facit, quod in se est, peccat 
mortaliter.”  Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: H. Bühlau, 
1883-1990) (WA), vol. 7,142,23. The quotation is thesis 13 from the Heidelberg Disputation; see WA 
1,354,5. 
2
“. . . figmentum in rebus seu titulus sine re”, WA 7,146,5. 
3
“Quia nulli est in manu sua quippiam cogitare mali aut boni, sed omnia . . . de necessitate absoluta 
eveniunt”, WA 7,146,7-8. 
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contain any reference to the idea of absolute necessity,
4
 and similar examples are not hard to 
find. On the other hand, what he wrote in Assertio seems to be more than tangentially 
attached to his own thinking. He defends it by referring to Scripture (Mt 10:29)
5
, to doctrinal 
tradition (Wyclif)
6
 and Latin poetry.
7
 In addition, it seems to be closely related to more 
extensive discussions in other works, particularly in the Lectures on Romans and in De servo 
arbitrio. The latter work was written as a rejection of Erasmus’ attack of what he considered 
as the determinism inherent in Luther’s rejection of free will, and here Luther seems to go 
even further in defending the idea of absolute necessity.
8
 At the same time, he in this work 
also goes quite far in maintaining both the idea that there is much in God that we do not 
know,
9
 and that humans freely cooperate with God.
10
 Luther’s position concerning the divine 
                                                 
4
WA 7,446-451. There is an English translation of Grund und Ursach in Martin Luther, Luther's 
works, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann and Jaroslav Pelikan, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia, 1958-1967) 
(LW), vol. 32, for this article, see pp. 92-94. There is as far as I know no English translation of 
Assertio. 
5
Luther’s quotation is inaccurate: “Folium arboris non cadit in terram sine voluntate patris vestri” 
(WA 7,146,9-10). The texts speak about sparrows, not leaves, and says nothing about God’s will; both 
the Greek and Latin text have “without the Father”. 
6
Wyclif was condemned at the Council in Constance for defending the view that everything happens 
by necessity. Both Wyclif and Hus pointed to the difference between the biblical idea of election and 
the closely connected emphasis on the hiddenness of the true believers, and the understanding of the 
church as an external organisation; see Martin Anton Schmidt, "Dogma und Lehre im Abendland II: 
Die Zeit der Scholastik", in Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte, ed. Carl Andresen, vol. 
1, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 567-754, 731-732 and 744. The reference to Wyclif 
in a work where Luther defends his theology against attack from the pope is therefore hardly 
accidental. 
7
Luther quotes from the 1
st
 century AD Marcus Manilius “certa stant omnia lege” (WA 7,146,9), 
everything stands by (eternal) law. 
8
“Ex quo sequitur irrefragabiliter, omnia quae facimus, omnia quae fiunt, etsi nobis videntur 
mutabiliter et contingenter fieri, revera tamen fiunt necessario et immutabiliter, si Dei voluntatem 
spectes”, WA 18,615,33; LW 33,37-38. 
9
“In Deo esse multa abscondita, quae ignoremus”, WA 18,606; LW 33,25. 
10
“Sed non operatur sine nobis, ut quos in hoc ipsum recreavit et conservat, ut operaretur in nobis et 
nos ei cooperaremur”, WA 18,754,13-14; LW 33,243. 
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determination of what occurs has therefore not only been criticised as incompatible with his 
own understanding of human freedom, it has also been criticised as incompatible with his 
insistence of the limit of human knowledge in relation to God. How can Luther maintain that 
God does everything when he at the same time both insists that we do not know what God 
does, and that humans freely do what they do? Is Luther just confused, or is there something 
his readers do not understand? 
 In what follows, I will try to answer these questions by taking a closer look at the 
passages where Luther develops his ideas of divine necessity most extensively and the 
historical context within which they are conceived.
11
 By looking at one text written before 
and two texts written after Luther's so-called evangelical breakthrough I will pay some 
attention to the question of how Luther’s new understanding of salvation informs his view of 
predestination and necessity. In this way I will try to substantiate the view that Luther in his 
mature understanding of divine necessity holds together divine determination and human 
freedom without letting the one perspective subvert the other in a way that is deeply informed 
by Chalcedonian two-nature Christology. In this way, I hope to contribute to the clarification 
of this central question in Luther scholarship.
12
 
                                                 
11
The background of Luther’s thought is usually found in via moderna Scholasticism, Renaissance 
humanism and late medieval mysticism. Through the latter he was also familiar with the tradition of 
negative theology in a way that deeply influenced his understanding of theological epistemology. For 
a brief summary of the discussion of the historical context of Luther’s thought, see Knut Alfsvåg, 
What no mind has conceived: An investigation of the significance of Christological apophaticism, 
Studies in philosophical theology 45 (Leuven, Paris, Walpole: Peeters, 2010), 177-180. 
12
The most recent summary of the discussion is found in Robert Kolb, Bound choice, election, and 
Wittenberg theological method: from Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans, 2005). For older overviews of the discussion with Erasmus and the relevant 
literature, see Klaus Schwarzwäller, Sibboleth: Die Interprätation von Luthers Schrift 'De servo 
arbitrio' seit Theodosius Harnack (München: Kaiser, 1969); Wolfgang Behnk, Contra Liberum 
Arbitrium Pro Gratia Dei: Willenslehre und Christuszeugnis bei Luther und ihre Interpretation durch 
die neuere Lutherforschung: eine systematisch-theologiegeschichtliche  Untersuchung (Frankfurt am 
Main: Lang, 1982); Knut Alfsvåg, Identity of Theology (Bangalore: Theological Book Trust, 1996). 
Harry J. McSorley, Luthers Lehre vom unfreien Willen nach seiner Hauptschrift De Servo Arbitrio im 
Lichte der biblischen und kirchlichen Tradition (München: Max Huebner Verlag, 1967) gives an 
extensive argument for the view that Luther combines a biblically founded view of enslaved will with 
an incompatible and indefensible view of necessity. Kolb, Bound choice, 26-28, and Oswald Bayer, 
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The understanding of Rom 8:28 
 
Luther’s first extensive treatment of the problem is given in his Lectures on Romans (1515) 
as a commentary on 8:28: “We know that for those who love God all things work together for 
good, for those who are called according to his purpose” (ESV).13 Luther finds the doctrine of 
predestination and election to be a most delightful one, the reason being that if salvation did 
not depend on a divine decree, it would depend on something as contingent as human will 
and human works, and then it could not stand.
14
 Only God’s election and immutable will, 
which for Luther is the same as God’s eternal and immovable love, has the power to resist all 
possible opponents of the salvation of humans.
15
 
 The Scholastics had tried to solve the problem of the relation between divine election 
and human freedom through the distinction between the logical necessity of a valid argument 
(necessitas consequentiae) and the factual necessity of the actual event (necessitas 
consequentis).  In this way, Thomas Aquinas combines the logical principle that what God 
wills, necessarily happens, with a rejection of factual or ontological determinism, as humans 
are still free to do or not to do what is for their best.
16
 From Luther’s point of view, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
"God's omnipotence", Lutheran Quarterly 23 (2009), 85-102, 98, suggest that Luther may have come 
to a similar conclusion himself, though their primary reference for this view is a later addition to the 
original text of De servo arbitrio; concerning the textual history of this passage, see Kolb, Bound 
choice, 298-299. 
13
WA 56,381-388; LW 25,371-378. For an interesting comparison of the interpretation of this key 
passage by Augustine, Luther and Calvin, see Steven D. Paulson, Lutheran theology (London and 
New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 219-221. 
14
“Quia si propositum Dei non esset et in nostro arbitrio et nostris operibus staret salus, contingenter 
staret. Quam contingentiam quam facile, non dico omnia illa mala simul, Sed vnum illorum impediret 
ac peruerteret!” WA 56,381,24-27; LW 25,371. 
15
“Ac non arbitrium nostrum, Sed inflexibilem et firmam suam predestinationis voluntatem per hec 
omnia probat”, WA 56,382,7-9; LW 25,371. The significance of this connection between 
omnipotence, predestination and the rejection of liberum arbitrium is well captured in Paulson, 
Lutheran theology, 19. 
16
McSorley, Luthers Lehre vom unfreien Willen, 146-150; Reinhard Hütter, "St. Thomas on Grace 
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problem of this distinction is that Paul’s argument in Rom 8:28 is then deprived of its 
significance. If God’s letting everything work for the good of the elect is dependent on the 
elect consenting to letting God work in them in this way, the idea of God as the guarantor of 
good is void of meaning. For the argument in Rom 8 to work, God must determine the actual 
event, not merely the underlying logic.  
 Luther accepts the distinction between logic and event as an expression of the fact that 
the event is contingent, i.e., susceptible to change, in a sense that logic is not. But if the point 
of Paul’s argument is the necessity of the event, the distinction between logical and factual 
necessity will not contribute to the understanding of Rom 8. The words by which the 
Scholastics maintain this distinction are therefore for Luther “vacua verba”.17 For even if the 
event is essentially contingent, i.e., not divine and therefore not immutable, it still takes place 
by necessity if God has predestined it.
18
 Before God there is no contingency; this is only 
something that belongs to the realm of humans.
19
 
 In Luther’s view, all arguments against predestination proceed from what he calls the 
prudence of the flesh, i.e., from placing oneself above God and subjecting him to questions of 
why he does what he does, which is the attitude Paul rejects in Rom 9:20.
20
 Luther therefore 
defends his view of necessity by systematically refuting all such arguments. Free will without 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Free Will in the Initium Fidei: The Surpassing Augustinian Synthesis", Nova et Vetera 5 (2007), 
521-554. 
17
WA 56,382,24; LW 25,372. 
18
“Quia nullus querit aut dubitat, an res creata sit contingens in esse suo i. e. mutabilis, Et non Deus 
seu immutabilis, Sed queritur de necessitate sequele, An fiat necessario, quod Deus predestinauit, Et 
concedunt, quod sic”, WA 56,383,4-7; LW 25,372-373. Contrary to what is maintained by Christine 
Helmer, "God from eternity to eternity: Luther's trinitarian understanding", Harvard Theological 
Review 96 (2003), 127-146, 131, Luther thus does not follow the medieval rule that “only the relations 
in the divine essence are necessary.” 
19
“Nulla est contingentia apud Deum simpliciter, Sed tantum coram nobis,” WA 56,383,19; LW 
25,373. Here, too, Luther refers to the idea that not even a leaf of a tree falls to the ground without the 
will of the Father, but without committing the error of referring it to Mt 10. 
20
WA 56,385,1-5; LW 25,375. 
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grace is in sin by necessity;
21
 it should therefore, following Augustine’s example, rather be 
called enslaved will. It is still free concerning the inferior things, but with regard to salvation, 
freedom presupposes grace.
22
 1 Tim 2:4 (God desires all people to be saved) therefore 
pertains only to the elect, and Christ did not die for everybody.
23
 Nobody is forced to sin; 
God is therefore not unjust in condemning those who sin by necessity. Even in hardening 
sinners, God’s will is good and should be recognized as such.24 This is a teaching that is well 
suited to promote humility in humans. It should thus be taught in order to extinguish all 
prudence of the flesh so that humans resign to the will of God even if it leads them to hell; 
this is the highest level among the elect.
25
 
 Luther’s interest is thus exclusively focussed on the interpretation of the event. The 
question if an event is in itself essentially good or bad, necessary or contingent, does, 
however, in Luther’s view not make sense; meaning and significance are always related to 
context. In relation to God, all events are necessary, as there is no contingency before God. 
They are necessarily good, if taking place according to God’s immutable love, or necessarily 
evil, if determined by their opposition to God’s will. But in relation to the created world, it is 
given to humans by divine decree to decide on their own what to do. Humans thus do what 
they want to do, but if not determined by divine love, it is still necessarily evil. In this way, 
Luther does not refrain from maintaining that humans are free to do what they want as far as 
they are considered in their relation with the rest of creation while at the same time being 
determined by God’s election as far as their relation to God is concerned. 
                                                 
21
“Liberum arbitrium extra gratiam constitutum Nullam habet prorsus facultatem ad Iustitiam, Sed 
necessario est in peccatis,” WA 56,385,15-16; LW 25,375. 
22
“Habita autem gratia proprie factum est Liberum, saltem respectu salutis. Liberum quidem semper 
est naturaliter, Sed respectu eorum, que in potestate sua sunt et se inferiora, Sed non supra se, cum sit 
captiuum in peccatis”, WA 56,385,18-21; LW 25,375. 
23
WA 56,385,23-28; LW 25,375-376. Here Luther thus maintains what was later known as the 
Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement. 
24
WA 56,385,32-386,5; LW 25,376. 
25
“Tertius optimus et extremus eorum, qui et in effectu seipsos resignant ad infernum pro Dei 
voluntate, Vt in hora mortis fit fortasse multis. Hii perfectissime mundantur a propria voluntate et 
'prudentia carnis'”, WA 56,388,10-14; LW 25,378. 
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 Luther’s discussion of necessity is thus not carried by a kind of metaphysics that tries 
to explain how God can be the cause of an event while still maintaining its contingence.
26
 
The coincidence of divine and human agency is for Luther the given starting point, not a 
conclusion to be defended.
27
 It thus reveals what has been described as a relational 
ontology,
28
 where the main characteristics of a phenomenon are determined by context and 
relation,
29
 and the concept of causality is replaced by the idea of participation.
30
 The same 
event can then simultaneously appear as determined in one relation and free in another. That 
this kind of metaphysics may issue in an untroubled combination of divine necessity and 
human liberty had been demonstrated some sixty years earlier by Nicholas Cusanus, 
particulary in his works De possest and De visione Dei.
31
 These are works Luther never 
                                                 
26
This is Thomas’ perspective, aptly summarized as the idea of divine transcendental causality; see 
Hütter, "St. Thomas on Grace and Free Will", 539. 
27
Both McSorley, Luthers Lehre vom unfreien Willen, 288-303 and Hütter, "St. Thomas on Grace and 
Free Will", 530, find Luther inconsistent in that he thus accepts the contingency Thomas defends with 
the distinction necessitas consequentiae/consequentis without accepting the distinction itself. What 
they fail to consider is that Luther rejects the “metaphysics of being” that according to Hütter, "St. 
Thomas on Grace and Free Will", 531 is what informs the distinction in the first place. 
28
On the difference between substance ontology and relational ontology, see further Oswald Bayer, 
"Philosophical Modes of Thought of Luther's Theology as an Object of Inquiry", in The Devil's 
Whore: Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition, ed. Jennifer Hockenbery Dragseth, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 13-22, 18. 
29
See Ferdinand Edward Cranz, "Cusanus, Luther and the mystical tradition", in Pursuit of holiness in 
late medieval and Renaissance religion, ed. Charles Trinkaus and Heiko A. Oberman, (Leiden: 
E.J.Brill, 1974), 93-102. Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, "Stoic Luther: Paradoxical sin and necessity", 
Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 73 (1982), 69-93, 88 thus speaks of the “binary perspectival 
system that operates in Luther’s argument”, but erroneously identifies Assertio as its initial 
occurrence. 
30
Cf. Robert W. Jenson, "An Ontology of Freedom in the De servo arbitrio of Luther", Modern 
Theology 10 (1994), 247-252, 252: “. . . the rapture-relation [through which we are rapt into willing 
and loving action] is not causative but participatory.” On the shift from participation to causality and 
back again, see further Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 171-175 (on Thomas and Cusanus) and 
pp. 195-196 and passim (on Luther). 
31
See Knut Alfsvåg, "Human liberty as participation in the divine in the work of Nicholas Cusanus", 
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mentions or alludes to, and there is therefore no reason to suspect direct influence. 
Representing a similar attempt at modifying via moderna nominalism by means of mysticism 
and negative theology, they are still considerably more interesting as possible frames of 
reference for Luther’s thought than the works of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.32 
 Reading Luther’s understanding of necessity on the background of a metaphysics he 
did not share, it appears as a confused and inconsistent adherence to ontological 
determinism,
33
 but from the point of view of a metaphysics of relations it merely maintains 
what seems fairly obvious as long as one accepts Luther’s basic point of orientation. When 
the almighty Creator acts, his acts are decisive, and there is nothing within the realm of the 
created and the contingent that can ever change this fact. When humans are considered in 
relation to the finite world, however, they are free to do what they want to do within the 
restrictions posed on them as created beings. And the question of how these perspectives 
interact to the effect that human liberty is real without subverting God's being in control of 
the overall outcome of human history, is a question that from Luther's point of view can 
never be explored in detail. 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Nicholas of Cusa on the Self and Self-Consciousness, ed. Walter Andreas Euler, Ylva Gustafsson, 
and Iris Wikström, (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2010), 39-66; Knut Alfsvåg, "Explicatio 
and complicatio: On the understanding of the relationship between God and the world in the work of 
Nicholas Cusanus", International Journal of Systematic Theology 14 (2012), 295-309. Cusanus solves 
the problem of divine necessity and human contingency by relativizing the difference between 
potentiality and actuality; in God are enfolded both the potential and the actual, and humans choosing 
one possibility over another does therefore not bear upon necessity as seen from God’s perspective. 
This shows a level of precision considerably beyond what is found in Luther’s Lectures on Romans; it 
is still compatible with Luther’s thought in a way that neither Thomism nor via moderna 
Scholasticism are. 
32
On similarities in thought structure between Cusanus and Luther, see Jean-Claude Lagarrigue, "Les 
souffrances "infernales" du Christ en Croix", in De venatione sapientiae: Akten des Symposiums in 
Trier vom 23. bis 25. Oktober 2008, ed. Walter Andreas Euler, (Trier: Paulinus, 2010), 301-318; Knut 
Alfsvåg, "Cusanus and Luther on human liberty", Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie 54 (2012), 66-80. 
33
Both McSorley, Luthers Lehre vom unfreien Willen  and Hütter, "St. Thomas on Grace and Free 
Will", 525-534 thus document that to the extent that one overlooks Luther’s philosophical reasons for 
rejecting the via moderna and concentrates on the theological ones, one tends to consider him either 
as guilty or inconsistent in relation to the accusation of determinism. 
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 Still, there are good reasons to doubt if Luther in this passage from his Lecture on 
Romans is able to apply these assumptions in a consistent way. What he aims at is to retain 
the full force of Paul’s argument that everything works for the good of the elect. He may thus 
be justified both in connecting the will of God with the actual event, and in maintaining the 
necessity of sin without grace. He may even to a considerable degree be justified in 
maintaining what he refers to in his refutation of the prudence of the flesh. He is, however, 
hardly justified in making the doctrine of predestination into a means of humiliation 
culminating in the doctrine of “resignatio ad infernum”. To induce in humans a sense of silent 
submission as they are led by God to heaven or hell according to his eternal decision is most 
certainly not what Paul is aiming at in Rom 8. Neither is this an attitude that is compatible 
with the untroubled joy of the immutability of divine election that is the starting point of 
Luther’s exegesis of this passage. Luther is thus captured by what could be described as the 
Manichaeic elements in his defence of Paul’s argument to the extent that one may argue that 
his exposition issues in a refutation of the apostle’s doctrine more than its explication.  
 Luther in this way follows the logic of his rejection of Semipelagianism in a way that  
subverts what he claims to defend. This is not uncommon in Luther’s works from this 
period.
34
 He is quite precise in what he rejects, but his positive unfolding of the Christian 
faith still lacks a stable foundation. 
 
Predestination as unquestioning trust in omnipotent divine goodness 
 
This changed with what Luther later described as his theological breakthrough, the 
understanding of how God justifies sinners by transmitting to them his own righteousness 
through the proclamation of the word received in faith.
35
 There has been a lot of scholarly 
discussion concerning the date of the breakthrough; there is, however, hardly any doubt that 
the first time we in Luther’s works find an interpretation of the righteousness of God that 
exactly parallels the retrospective report of the old Luther is in the exegesis of Ps 5:9 in 
                                                 
34
For a defence of a similar way of reading even a work as late as the Heidelberg Disputation (1518), 
see Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 198. 
35
Luther’s most detailed report on this breakthrough dates from 1545 and is found in WA 54,185-186;  
LW 34,336-338. 
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Operationes in Psalmos.
36
 Interestingly, the exposition of this psalm also contains a fairly 
detailed discussion of the problem of predestination which allows for an investigation of how 
Luther’s evangelical discovery informed his understanding of divine necessity.37 
 The understanding of salvation as consisting in nothing but the transfer of divine 
righteousness to the sinner lets Luther explore the world of faith from a creatio ex nihilo-
perspective that necessarily issues in a doctrine of predestination.
38
 But if there is absolutely 
nothing in humans to distinguish between the saved and the condemned, how can one be sure 
that one belongs among the elect?
39
 Luther has two answers to this question. God above all 
wants humans to trust him; one can therefore be sure that questions of doubt come from the 
devil.
40
 And if one is tempted by the question to demand a sign of one’s own election, this is 
merely a sign that one does not trust God and thus does not respect his divinity and wants to 
be God oneself.
41
 To make queries about the reasons behind God’s judgements is a task for 
the devil, not for believers. What God requires, is that his will is given to humans in a way 
                                                 
36
For a presentation of this passage with an overview of the main literature concerning Luther’s 
theological breakthrough, see  Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 200-201. The Latin text of 
Operationes, which are lectures on Ps 1-22 held 1519-1521, are found in WA 5 and in Martin Luther, 
Operationes in Psalmos, Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers, ed. Gerhard 
Hammer and Manfred Biersack, 2 vols. (Köln and Wien: Bohlau, 1981/1991). For an English 
translation of Operationes, see Martin Luther, Commentary on the First Twenty-Two Psalms, Henry 
Cole trans., 2 vols. (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1826); volume one, covering the commentary to 
Ps 1-7 is reprinted as Martin Luther, Commentary on the First Twenty-two Psalms, ed. John Nicholas 
Lenker, Henry Cole trans., vol. I (Sunbury, Penn.: Lutherans in All Lands Co., 1903). In what 
follows, I refer to the latter edition as Commentary. 
37
The passage on predestination is found in WA 5,172-177; Commentary 280-290. For a more 
extensive discussion of this passage, see Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 212-220. 
38
On the understanding of salvation as creation from nothing in the commentary on Ps 5, see Alfsvåg, 
What no mind has conceived, 210-212. 
39
“Sed quid, inquies, si [diabolus] me de praedestinatione vexet et inquietet, quod frustra sperem, si 
non sum praedestinatus?”, WA 5,172,1; Commentary 280. 
40
WA 5,172,3-12; Commentary 280. 
41
WA 5,172,36-173,10; Commentary 282. 
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that issues in their unyielding trust and commitment.
42
 
 There is thus little left of the resignatio ad infernum-perspective from Lectures on 
Romans. Luther no longer understands humans as indifferent in relation to the apparent 
randomness of the decisions of the almighty one. On the contrary, what follows from the new 
emphasis on the transfer of divine righteousness is a reinterpretation of human resignation 
according to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo; it is precisely when humans understand that 
they can contribute nothing that the area is cleared for recreation of humans in the image of 
God.  The outcome is a kind of fusion of divine righteousness and human will whereby the 
human relationship with God is characterized as trust, not as resignatio.  
 Trust is, however, not knowledge; the new emphasis on faith and trust therefore 
sharpens the ontology of relations from Lecture on Romans by emphasizing that the desire 
for a divine justification for his doing this or that has nothing to do with faith and trust; it is, 
in fact, diabolic. God does what he wants to, and what he wants happens with necessity; in 
this respect there is no difference between Lecture on Romans and Operationes in Psalmos. 
New is, however, the emphasis that what God actually wants to do, is to endow humans with 
his own righteousness; humans will therefore, to the extent that they are captured by the 
biblical message, rest assured that what God gives them, is necessarily good. This issues in a 
kind of trust that is only conceivable in relation to the immutable love of the eternal God.
43
 
 The understanding of the transfer of divine righteousness as the foundation of the 
relationship between God and humans therefore lets Luther relate to the all-determining 
power of God’s will with confidence. Faith is the reception of the blessing inherent in the 
message that God determines all there is including the reception of this message as a blessing. 
From this point of view, divine necessity thus necessarily (!) implies logical circularity; one 
will only trust God’s determining power if that is what God determines by letting the human 
                                                 
42
“Neque enim aliud deus requirit, quam voluntatem suam nobis esse assidua sollicitudine 
commendatam”, WA 5,172; Commentary 281. 
43
Cf. Eilert Herms, "Gewißheit in Martin Luthers 'De servo arbitrio'", Lutherjahrbuch 67 (2000), 23-
50, 26: “Der einzige und ausreichende Grund für die Infallibilität des Glaubens ist in Luthers Augen, 
daß es für den Glauben . . . wesentlich ist, daß sein einziger Gengenstand Gott selbst ist . . . wie er 
selbst durch sich selbst und durch nichts sonst sich dem Glauben vorgegeben und diesen dadurch auf 
sich bezogen hat.” There is no difference between Operationes and De servo arbitrio in this respect. 
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subject partake of trust in God. And this trust is, in so far as it is given by God, a trust in 
God’s goodness that spontaneously does what God wants as an instrument of his power.44 
Good works are thus certainly to be done; what humans do is not uninteresting. But God can 
never be manipulated; his immutability is the fixed foundation of all there is,
45
 and good 
works are never to be considered as meritorious. And the question of how divine 
immutability relates to the reality of humans being able to do what they want to do and being 
admonished to do what they ought to do is beyond human understanding and should therefore 
not even be asked.
46
  
 The doctrine of justification by faith is in this way expanded into an ontology of trust 
where faith that God as the giver of good gifts is the ultimate reality of all that occurs is 
considered as the key element in grasping the world as it is. This can only be maintained if 
one refrains from asking the question of how the all-determining reality of God’s activity 
relates to the freedom of the activity of humans, as the very act of asking the question leaves 
the logical circularity and thus reveals an ontology incompatible with the one inherent in the 
doctrine of justification. Luther thus consistently rejects an approach to the world that 
replaces the act of receiving all that occurs as divine gift with an ontology intent on achieving 
a timeless knowledge of things as they are in themselves,
47
 and the significance of this 
rejection is considerably enhanced by Luther’s theological breakthrough. According to the 
mature Luther as he appears in Operationes, we know what God does (everything), we know 
what we should do (all we possibly can), and we know that God’s love is immutable to the 
extent that it is not changed by anything we do. The joy of this knowledge is the content of 
the Christian faith issuing in humans working according to the will of God. The 
understanding of the precise relationship between divine and human activity is, however, not 
                                                 
44
WA 5,168,34-169,8; Commentary 276. 
45
Luther here repeats the reference to the falling leaves; WA 5,174,18; Commentary 284. 
46
“Quando ergo his praeceptis dei prohibetur cura ista curiosa operum dei, quae nobis ostensa sunt 
esse supra captum et sensum nostrum et incomprehensibilia iudicia eius, cum timore in praeceptis dei 
potius occupari debemus, ut in eum speremus cum fiducia, et haec studia impossibilia diabolo in caput 
suum vertere”,  WA 5,173; Commentary 283-284. 
47
Cf. Luther’s critique of the timeless logic of the Scholastics as summarized by Bayer, "God's 
omnipotence", 94. 
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given to humans as a meaningful area of scrutiny and research, and lack of respect for this 
limit leaves humans as followers of the devil instead of trusting believers in God.  
 The Chalcedonian thought structure of the mature Luther thus begins to emerge.
48
 
Real divinity and real humanity are united in a way that focuses precisely on the 
unknowability of the relationship in a way that closely parallels the negativity of the 
Chalcedonian adverbs (inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter). Through this 
union, humans are given divine righteousness as the foundation of their trust, and divine 
goodness as the quality of their works. 
 Informed by his new understanding of divine righteousness as the foundation of 
human existence, Luther has thus left the idea of resignatio ad infernum that challenged the 
consistency of his thought in Lecture on Romans and made his exposition of Rom 8:28 into 
something more like a refutation. Both the apostle’s untroubled joy of the reliability of divine 
predestination and his insistence that it, if correctly perceived, stimulates human activity 
rather than stifles it (cf. Rom 6:1-14) is now something Luther has appropriated. His thought 
thus appears as considerably more consistent and satisfactory in Operationes than in Lectures 
on Romans. 
 What, then, about De servo arbitrio, which is arguably Luther’s most penetrating 
analysis of the questions related to the problem of necessity? 
 
The immutability of God’s promises 
 
Erasmus reacts against the doctrine of necessity he has found in Assertio by maintaining that 
it is the result of irreligious curiosity even to discuss if God’s foreknowledge is contingent (in 
Luther’s view, it is not), if our will contributes to our salvation (in Luther’s view, it does not) 
or if what we do is good or evil by necessity.
49
 Luther protests vehemently.
50
 In his view, it is 
                                                 
48
On the Chalcedonian structure of Luther’s thought, see further Johann Anselm Steiger, "The 
communicatio idiomatum as the axle and motor of Luther's theology", Lutheran Quarterly (2000), 
125-158; Kjell Ove Nilsson, "Communicato idiomatum as the Key to Luther's Theology", in 
Reformationer: Universitet, kirkehistorie, Luther. Festskrift til Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, ed. Tine 
Reeh and Anna Vind, (København: C. A. Reitzels forlag, 2006), 365-381. 
49
De libero arbitrio Ia8, quoted from Erasmus, Ausgewählte Schriften, 4 vols. (Darmstadt: 
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essential for a Christian to know and assert that God’s foreknowledge is not contingent, but 
that he determines everything through his infallible will.
51
 This follows from Luther’s 
understanding of the conflation of will, knowledge and activity in God. God’s knowledge of 
what will happen is the reason of what happens, and is never changed by what actually 
occurs.
52
 It thus follows irrefutably, Luther argues, that what we do and what happens, even if 
it to us seem mutable and contingent, happen necessarily and immutably in so far as the will 
of God is one’s point of orientation.53 In a way that closely parallels the similar passages in 
Lectures on Romans, Luther therefore rejects the distinction between necessitas 
consequentiae and necessitas consequentis
54
 and calls it a ludibrium, a laughingstock,
55
 here, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), vol. 4: “. . . nec erat irreligiosa curiositate irrumpendum 
ad illa retrusa, ne dicam supervacanea, ad deus contingenter praesciat aliquid, utrum nostrum voluntas 
aliquid agas in his, quae pertinent ad aeternam salutem, an tantum patiatur ab agente gratia, an 
quicquid facimus boni sive mali, mera necessitate faciamus vel patiamur potius.” For a presentation of 
the context of the debate between Erasmus and Luther, see Alfsvåg, Identity, 11-21. 
50
“Hoc prorsus nihil valet Erasme, das ist zu viel”, WA 18,610,5; LW 33,29. 
51
“Est itaque et hoc imprimis necessarium et salutare Christiano, nosse, quod Deus nihil praescit 
contingenter, sed quod omnia incommutabili et aeterna infallibilique voluntate et praevidet et proponit 
et facit”, WA 18,615,12-14; LW 33,37. 
52
Horst Beintker, "Luthers Gotteserfahrung und Gottesanschauung." in Leben und Werk Martin 
Luthers von 1526 bis 1546, ed. Helmar Junghans, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 39-
62, 53, summarizes it in this way: “Luther war von der Allgegenwart Gottes in jedem Augenblick 
durchdrungen, und darin wurzelt auch der Prädestinationsgedanke.”    
53
“Scilicet voluntatem immutabilem Dei praedicas esse discendam, immutabilem eius vero 
praescientiam nosse vetas. An tu credis, quod nolens praesciat, aut ignarus velit? Si volens praescit, 
aeterna est et immobilis (quia natura) voluntas, si praesciens vult, aeterna est et immobilis (quia 
natura) scientia. 
 Ex quo sequitur irrefragabiliter, omnia quae facimus, omnia quae fiunt, etsi nobis videntur 
mutabiliter et contingenter fieri, revera tamen fiunt necessario et immutabiliter, si Dei voluntatem 
spectes. Voluntas enim Dei efficax est, quae impediri non potest, cum sit naturalis ipsa potentia Dei, 
Deinde sapiens, ut falli non possit”, WA 18,615,26-25; LW 33,37-38. 
54
WA 18,616,13-617,19; LW 33,39-40. 
55
WA 18,617,14. When Hütter, "St. Thomas on Grace and Free Will", 530, calls this “the most 
consequential philosophical error” in De servo arbitrio without even trying to grasp the philosophical 
position from which the rejection is made, one is tempted to extend Luther’s critique to his (mis-) 
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too, adding references to poetic passages on divine immutability.
56
 
 The knowledge that everything happens by necessity is essential for faith, Luther 
insists, as it is the foundation for trust in God’s promises.57 For this reason, the doctrine of 
divine immutabiliy is central in the Bible, and Luther quotes Rom 3:4 (God is true though 
everyone is a liar), 9:6 (the word of God has not failed) and Titus 1:2 (God, who never lies, 
has promised) to prove it.
58
 
 The kind of necessity Luther maintains is immutability, not coercion.
59
 What humans 
do when God is not working in them for what is good, is thus necessarily evil even though 
they are not forced to do it; they certainly do it willingly enough.
60
 There are two reasons this 
doctrine should be proclaimed; it promotes humility
61
 and opens the possibility for faith as 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpreters.  
56
WA 18,617,23-618,18; LW 33,41. The important poet is now Virgil. 
57
“Si enim dubitas aut contemnis nosse, quod Deus omnia non contingenter sed necessario et 
immutabiliter praesciat et velit, quomodo poteris eius promissionibus credere, certo fidere et niti?” 
WA 18,619,1-3; LW 33, 42. Jenson, "Ontology of Freedom", 248, comments on this text in the 
following way: “. . . for someone to always keep his promises, he must be sovereign over all 
contingencies.” In a similar way Boyle, "Stoic Luther: Paradoxical sin and necessity", 90, maintains 
that divine infallibility must be preserved, “because otherwise a man cannot believe in God’s 
promises.” Both John Loeschen, "Promise and necessity in Luther's De servo arbitrio." Lutheran 
Quarterly 23 (1971), 257-267 and Herms, "Gewißheit" therefore primarily understand De servo 
aribitrio as theology of trust. Bayer, "God's omnipotence", 87 emphasizes that trust in the promise is 
what “unlocks Luther’s entire understanding of God’s omnipotence”. Paulson, Lutheran theology, 22 
points to the enormous difference between predestined silence (“fate”) and predestined promise. 
58
WA 18,619,10-15; LW 33,42. 
59
That necessity for Luther means immutability, not compulsion is emphasized by Boyle, "Stoic 
Luther: Paradoxical sin and necessity", 86. This is therefore a kind of necessity that does not exclude 
reward; see WA 18,693,30-694,29; LW 33,151-152; and further Knut Alfsvåg, "God's fellow 
workers: The understanding of the relationship between the human and the divine in Maximus 
Confessor and Martin Luther", Studia theologica 62 (2008), 175-193. 
60
WA 18,634,14-36; LW 33,64. As maintained by Paulson, Lutheran theology, 83-84, this is the 
reason humans acting out of their own potential are under the wrath of God. 
61
WA 18,632,27-633,6; LW 33,61-62.  According to the resignatio-doctrine  in Lectures on Romans, 
this is the only reason. 
 16 
 
trust in God even if it appears as if he condemns.
62
 This possibility is realized if God works in 
us so that our will, breathed upon by the Holy Spirit, wants and does the good in a way that 
will never be overcome even by the gates of hell,
63
 the goodness of the human will in this 
case being established through its union with divine immutability. It is the same circularity 
that is at play here as in Operationes; by being fused with divine immutability, humans 
necessarily do what is good in the same way as they necessarily do what is evil if this 
relationship is not established. Luther is not maintaining ontological determinism; he is 
insisting on the theocentricity of goodness with the implication that if the trusting unity 
between God and humans is not established, humans cannot avoid doing what is evil.
64
  
 Why, then, is the circularity of evil broken and faith and goodness established in some 
cases, but not in others? Luther’s answer is that we do not know; we are not even allowed to 
ask, as the secret will of the divine majesty is not a matter of human concern.
65
 One should 
rather occupy oneself with God incarnated, which is where all the treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge are hidden.
66
 The unity of divine immutability and human createdness was 
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WA 18,633,7-24; LW 33,62-63. 
63
“. . . si Deus in nobis operatur, mutata et blande assibilata per spiritum Dei voluntas iterum mera 
lubentia et pronitate ac sponte sua vult et facit, non coacte, ut nullis contrariis mutari in aliud possit, 
ne portis quidem inferi vinci aut cogi, sed pergit volendo et lubendo et amando bonum,” WA 
18,634,37-635,2; LW 33,65. 
64
As maintained by Jenson, "Ontology of Freedom", 248-249, humans “cannot choose what to 
choose”; they are always determined by what they have chosen to do. This is an important reason why 
Luther considers “liberum arbitrium” as an empty word. 
65
Luther maintains this with a one-sidedness that borders on the resignatio-idea from Lectures on 
Romans, but still with a different emphasis on faith as trust in tribulation: “Sed fides et spiritus . . . 
Deum bonum credunt, etiam si omnes homines perderet” (WA 18,708,8-9). Following Luther’s 
insistence that the Holy Spirit is found in the grammar, it is tempting to locate the evangelical centre 
of Luther’s thought precisely in the shift from the reality of the “in effectu seipsos resignant ad 
infernum pro Dei voluntate” from the Lectures on Romans (note 25) to the anxiety of “etiam si omnes 
homines perderet” as the ground from which faith grows. 
66
“Nos dicimus, ut iam antea diximus, de secreta illa voluntate maiestatis non esse disputandum et 
temeritatem humanam, quae perpetua perversitate, relictis necessariis, illam semper impetit et tentat, 
esse avocandam et retrahendam, ne occupet sese scrutandis illis secretis maiestatis, quae 
impossibileest attingere, ut quae habitet lucem inaccessibilem, teste Paulo. Occupet vero sese cum 
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paradigmatically established with the incarnation of Christ, and there is no other way of 
reestablishing it than by taking this particular unity as its given foundation. The 
Christological foundation of Luther’s thought is thus even more explicit in De servo arbitrio 
than in Operationes.
67
 
 This lets Luther adjust his earlier interpretation of God’s universal will to salvation as 
maintained in 1 Tim 2:4. In Lectures on Romans, he said that this passage only pertained to 
the elect. According to De servo arbitrio, it informs us that God’s saving will is universal as 
far as God is revealed and proclaimed, i.e., as far as he is known through Christ, and for 
Luther, this is now the only thing that matters.
68
 Questions beyond that will never be 
answered and should not be asked.
69
 Humans can rest assured that in so far as they relate to 
God through his word, his promise of salvation is immutable and therefore absolutely 
reliable. The point is the same as in Operationes; predestination is manifest as trust in God, 
and what does not promote this trust, does not have its origin in God. 
 What they do who remain untouched by the proclamation of the promises is therefore 
necessarily evil by the same kind of immutability that for believers establishes the 
trustworthiness of the promises. One may therefore ask – and Erasmus certainly does70 – if 
not this leads to an understanding of God’s all-determining omnipotence that places good and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Deo incarnato seu (ut Paulus loquitur) cum Jhesu crucifixo, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et 
scientiae, sed absconditi; per hunc enim abunde habet, quid scire et non scire debeat”, WA 18,689,18-
25; LW 33,145-146.  
67
There has been some discussion of the relation between Christology and predestination in De servo 
arbitrio; for a summary of the discussion, see Alfsvåg, Identity, 134, note 183. The idea of a 
substantial difference between De servo arbitrio and Luther’s more Christocentric work as 
maintained, e.g., by Hütter, "St. Thomas on Grace and Free Will", 524-525, is unfounded. 
68
Cf. Paulson, Lutheran theology, 24: “For that reason, the ground on which the church stands or falls 
is not an objective doctrine of justification, it is the advent of the preached word.” 
69
“Recte, inquam, si de Deo praedicato dixeris. Nam ille vult omnes homines salvos fieri . . . Verum 
quare maiestas illa vitium hoc voluntatis nostrae non tollit aut mutat in omnibus, cum non sit in 
potestate hominis, aut cur illud ei imputet, cum non possit homo eo carere, quaerere non licet, ac si 
multum quaeras, nunquam tamen invenies, sicut Paulus Rom. 11. [9, 20] dicit: Tu quis es, qui 
respondeas Deo?” WA 18,686,5-12; LW 33,140. 
70
De libero arbitrio IIa15. 
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evil equally close to God’s will. Does Luther’s insistence on the divine determination of all 
that occurs, at least as far as its moral character is concerned, depict God as morally 
ambiguous?  
 Luther meets this question with a double strategy. On the one hand he maintains that 
if the alternative to understanding God’s presence as decisive is to understand him as absent 
while humans on their own make up their minds about good and evil, this alternative view 
dethrones God and reduces faith in God to an absurdity.
71
 In Luther’s view, God is either 
Lord or uninteresting; in so far as faith retains its necessary realism, it therefore cannot 
replace the doctrine of the determining power of divine immutability with a doctrine of the 
omnipotence of human liberty which may or may not employ God in its service.
72
 
 On the other hand Luther defends a doctrine of God working in and through even the 
evil ones, but at one remove from their wickedness and godlessness. It is, he maintains, as 
when a good craftsman works with a jagged ax; the outcome is bad, irrespective of the 
goodness of the craftsman.
73
 Luther thus combines an understanding of God’s essential 
goodness with his insistence that God indeed is the acting agent in all that occurs as far as the 
will of God is concerned.
74
 
 It has been objected that Luther here introduces a new inconsistency in his thought by 
trying to answer the very question he tells his readers not to ask, the answer being that God is 
given responsibility for evil in a way that is incompatible with Luther’s insistence that we 
don’t know what God in his essence is responsible for.75 In my view this objection fails. The 
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WA 18,688,19-20; LW 33,144. 
72
Gavin Hyman, A short history of atheism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), argues that the beginning of 
modern atheism is Descartes’ instrumentalization of belief in God; Luther’s argument De servo 
arbitrio amounts to his insistence that Erasmus is in this respect should be seen as Descartes’ 
predecessor. 
73
WA 18,709,10-36; LW 33,175-176. 
74
As emphasized by Herms, "Gewißheit", 42, humans are in Luther’s view even as sinners determined 
by divine creativity and not, as in Kant, by their own freedom. 
75
For a summary of this critique, particularly as maintained by Barth and his followers, see Behnk, 
Contra Liberum Arbitrium, 128-131; Bayer, "God's omnipotence", 89. Defending Luther against his 
accusers are Fredrik Brosché, Luther on predestination: The antinomy and the unity between love and 
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understanding of God as the acting agent in all that occurs in the world is for Luther an 
essential part of the Christian faith.
76
 Unknowability is related to the impossibility, apart from 
faith that keeps strictly to the promises, to understand how this kind of seemingly morally 
dubious activity can be the work of the loving Father. There is in Luther’s view no doubt that 
what happens in the history of salvation culminating in the passion and death of Christ is a 
manifestation of the general principle that what happens in the world are God’s acts “si Dei 
voluntatem spectes”. Where faith moves into lands unattainable through reason and 
experience and thus has to navigate on trust alone
77
 is in its insistence that what these events 
reveal is God’s goodness. This is a level of understanding that can only be achieved by 
receiving the story of the cross as God’s promise of salvation.  
 Luther’s solution to the problem of Manichaeism is thus strictly Christological. That 
the events when seen from another perspective still may seem to be evil is then no 
contradiction. This is certainly a view of evil with which one can find oneself in 
disagreement, but hardly for the reason that it is inconsistent. 
 Neither is Luther inconsistent when he maintains both that God necessarily 
determines all that happens, and that humans are free to do what they want. Luther’s view of 
the necessity of the event as maintained in De servo arbitrio is primarily an emphasis of the 
immutability of its moral character. If not determined by the union of God and human 
established through faith, what humans do is necessarily evil. Luther is primarily interested in 
this problem as far as it contributes to the understanding of the humans being created and 
                                                                                                                                                        
wrath in Luther's concept of God (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1978), 120 and Regin Prenter, 
"Luther als Theologe", in Luther und die Theologie der Gegenwart, ed. Leif Grane and Bernhard 
Lohse, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 112-124. 
76
As emphasized by Bayer, "God's omnipotence", 91, this is closely related to God’s oneness; there is 
no similar power next to God. According to Paulson, Lutheran theology, 20, the doctrine of free will 
is therefore incompatible with monotheism. 
77
Cf. the emphasis on “lux Euangelii, quae solo verbo et fide valet” in WA 18,785,20; LW 33,292. In 
his interpretation of this passage Paul R. Hinlicky, "Leibnizian Transformation? Reclaiming the 
Theodicy of Faith", in Transformations in Luther's Theology: Historical and Contemporary 
Reflections, ed. Christine Helmer and Bo Kristian Holm, (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 
2011), 85-103, 101 goes considerably beyond Luther’s perspective in conflating faith with reason as 
informed by the light of glory. 
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recreated in the image of God as the necessary condition for their doing what is good, and he 
insists that (the lack of) this recreation has immutable consequences. He is less interested in 
the problem of how to relate divine providence and human freedom in general, though he 
remains convinced that the Scholastic way of handling it (the necessitas 
consequentiae/consequentis-distinction with its implied understanding of God as 
differentiated transcendental causality) is incompatible with biblically informed perceptions 
both of creation as God’s gift and of salvation as transfer of and participation in divine 
righteousness.
78
 He might have found Cusanus’ approach to this problem in De possest 
compatible with his own approach in a way that Thomas’ is not; it is probably even more 
significant that he did not find this particular problem worthy of serious consideration. 
 De servo arbitrio thus remains one of the most penetrating analyses of the relation 
between divine immutability and the human ability to choose. Humans necessarily do as they 
want to do, and the immutability of this situation is their basic problem, which is solved only 
by the their discovering of and being included in the love of God as hidden in the 
inexplorable, though for faith fully manifest unity of God and human in Christ as the key to 
the understanding of the world. 
 
The immutability of divine creativity 
 
 In Luther’s view, one can only relate adequately to God’s acts by receiving them as 
decisive.
79
 Created entities have therefore no independent reality in so far as their relationship 
                                                 
78
See further Michael Plathow, "Das Cooperatio-Verständnis M Luthers im Gnaden- und 
Schöpfungsbereich: zur Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Mensch und Schöpfung", Luther 56 (1985), 
28-46, 37: "Bei den Aussagen zu . . . Mitwirken des Geschöpfes geht es . . . um Gewißheitsaussagen, 
die Luther aus der Interpretation biblischer Texte gewinnt und in der Bibel bezeugt weiß.  Es geht also 
nicht um Erwägungen und Reflexionen, die Schöpfer und Geschöpf als causa prima und causa 
secunda in ein allgemein einsichtiges ontologisches System der naturlichen Vernunft einordnen, wie 
es die thomistisch-molinistischen Auseinandersetzungen beherrschte, den Streit um Bajus und den 
Jansenismus, aber auch die altprotestantische Orthodoxie." 
79
As emphasized by Bayer, "God's omnipotence", 97, Luther rejects the Ockhamist view of 
omnipotence as divine potentiality in favour of an understanding of God as actively present in what 
actually occurs. 
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with God is concerned. What exists owes its existence and manifestation to God. Due to their 
sinfulness, humans have to be recreated in order to recognize this dependence; basically, 
however, even human dependence is closely related to the kind of dependence other kinds of 
created entities have. At the same time, humans are created with the capacity of acting 
independently, and their dependence as creatures does not nullify this independence. 
 The key to an adequate perception of the world is therefore to understand life as 
divine gift in a way that establishes the possibility of human creativity and independence. 
Luther’s solution to this problem is to insist that life is only lived as it was meant to be 
through the transfer of divine justice and goodness to the human. Thus endowed, humans act 
as created in the image of God; they manifest their humanity as dependence on their 
Creator.
80
 This happened paradigmatically in Christ, and will therefore only be repeated 
through participation in Christ as truly human and truly divine.
81
 The realization of true 
humanity therefore only occurs by receiving the story of Christ as the means through which 
the recreative power of God manifests itself.  
 The theocentricity of Luther’s world view thus issues in a Christology of participation 
conceived as a doctrine of justification. As the goal of this doctrine is to maintain human 
independence and creativity as dependence on God as creator, it can only be upheld through 
an ontology of relation whereby human experience is interpreted according to two different 
contexts, the relation to God and the relation to other creatures.
82
 In relation to God, humans 
are always dependent in a way that can only be captured through a doctrine of necessity and 
predestination;
83
 in relation to other creatures, humans are free in a way that can only be 
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As emphasized by Jenson, "Ontology of Freedom", 250, there is in this respect no difference 
between fallen and unfallen creation. 
81
Herms, "Gewißheit", 43-44, therefore speaks of “Heilsgewißheit als Gewißheit eines 
asymmetrischen Inklusionsverhältnisses” established through “das äußere Wort des Evangeliums”. 
82
So also Inge Lønning, "Gott VIII. Neuzeit/Systematisch-theologisch", in Theologische 
Realenzyklopädie, ed. Gerhard Müller, vol. XIII, (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 668-
708, 672: “Für Luther hängt alles an der Unterscheidung der beiden Relationen [Weltverhältnis und 
Gottesverhältnis] . . .. Für Erasmus geht es dagegen darum, die tendenzielle Identität der beiden 
Relationen festzuhalten.” 
83
According to Herms, "Gewißheit", assurance in relation to the Creator is therefore always 
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captured through a doctrine of human liberty.
84
 Confusion occurs when the Chalcedonian 
immutabiliter is replaced by a divine-human mixture according to which the God relationship 
is seen as established through free choice or determinism is seen as what characterizes the  
relationship with other creatures. This invariably occurs, though, when the ontology of 
participation is replaced with an ontology of being according to which the question of who 
decides, God or human, is a question that can be given an answer while being detached from 
the distinction between Creator and creation. Both Semipelagian Scholasticism and Erasmian 
deliberative humanism are examples of this kind of ontology, issuing in the understanding of 
human freedom as the abstract ability to choose both in relation to God and the world. In 
Luther’s view, they are both incompatible with the theocentric anthropology of the Christian 
faith. Understanding divine action through the telling of the story as decisive, Christian 
thought is in Luther’s view incompatible with an ontology of the timeless, as faith is always 
dependent on what occurs when God acts.
85
 
 Predestination thus manifests itself in the reception of the biblical story of Christ as 
the manifestation of the immutable infinity of divine love as liberation of humans from the 
chains of sin and disbelief. For faith, it is therefore this story that defines the reality of what 
occurs in the world. The doctrine of necessity as understood by Luther is therefore closely 
related to the kind of spirituality whereby faith finds the realities of the world made manifest 
through the word of God. This presupposes an understanding of the divine promises as 
absolutely reliable; Luther’s ontology of relations is therefore basically a world view that 
finds the promises of God as the one and only foundation for the adequate reception of what 
occurs. Real existence is existence according to these promises. Even in this respect, non-
relational ontology fails, and should therefore in Luther’s view never be accepted within 
Christian theology. 
 Luther reacted against an ontology that combined the doctrine of divine immutability 
with an understanding of human liberty as independence. It is tempting to read Nietzsche as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Notwendigkeitsgewißheit”. 
84
Cf. Herms, "Gewißheit", 36: “Als geschaffene Freiheit kann sie nur im eingeschränkten Sinne frei 
genannt werden. Aber in diesem eingeschränkten Sinne ist dieses Freisein real.” 
85
Cf. the difference in Herms, "Gewißheit", 26-27 between truth as “Sache” and “Geschehen”, where 
Luther is exclusively interested in the latter both in the sense of memory and expectation. 
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confirmation that Luther was right; religiosity founded on human choice reduces the 
significance of divine presence in a way that entails the birth of modern atheism.
86
 In this 
perspective, Hegel represents an attempt at reestablishing religion by modifying the idea of 
divine immutability, an approach that arguably has informed much 20
th
 century theology as 
seen, e.g., in the discussion of the alleged identity between immanent and economic Trinity.
87
 
Luther, for all his emphasis on the identity between God and Christ, still insisted on the 
difference of immutability to the extent that he considered the idea of Deus absconditus as 
essential;
88
 in relation to much contemporary theology, Luther’s voice can therefore only be 
heard as a voice of protest.
89
 In his view, divine presence is manifest in promises
90
 whose 
                                                 
86
Cf. Lønning, "Gott", 673 (on Erasmus): “Es fällt jedoch auf, daß die Vorherrschaft der Moralischen 
Dimension . . . zu einer Entfunktionalisierung des christlichen Gotteslehre . . . führt.” 
87
To maintain that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity could be seen as an attempt at 
defending the reality of revelation, whereas the identity of the immanent Trinity with the economic 
may lead to a conflation of God and history, the ultimate outcome of which arguably is Feuerbach’s 
theory of religion. On this issue, see Peter C. Phan, "Systematic issues in trinitarian theology", in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter C. Phan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 13-29, 17-18. 
88
For an interesting discussion of how Luther’s Christology informed his understanding of divine 
impassibility, see Jeffrey G. Silcock, "The truth of divine impassibility", Lutheran Theological 
Journal 45 (2011), 198-207. His conclusion is that “Luther regarded the suffering of God in the 
suffering of the man Jesus as an incomprehensible mystery that can only be expressed paradoxically.” 
God thus suffered impassibly in the flesh; the Chalcedonian combination of inconfuse and 
inseparabiliter is maintained to the effect that the how of this act remains inexplicable. 
89
So also Mark C. Mattes, The role of justification in contemporary theology (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), criticizing Jüngel, Pannenberg, Moltmann and Robert Jenson (who attaches to the 
anthropology referred to above a Trinitarian speculation for which there is no precedent in Luther). 
For a strikingly similar critique from Orthodox and Catholic perspectives, see David Bentley Hart, 
The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 
2003), 155-167, mainly criticising Jenson, and  Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its legacy: An approach to 
fourth-century Trinitarian theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 404-414, mentioning 
Barth, Balthasar, process theology, Volf and Rahner among others. 
90
According to Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther's theology: A contemporary interpretation (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 339, the “grandiose blunder” of not distinguishing between the 
hidden and trinitarian God dislocates the gospel and leads to post-Christian natural theology in the 
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trustworthiness and reliability can only be maintained through a doctrine of divine 
immutability and changelessness. Mutability is then an essential aspect of the created, which 
for this reason is unsuitable as the foundation of an ontology comprising all aspects of reality. 
Such an ontology can only be founded on the rationally unbridgeable and Christologically 
transcended difference between Creator and creation. For Luther it is therefore the story of 
Christ that manifests the reality of what occurs in the world to the effect that one’s receptivity 
or lack of receptivity of this story immutably establishes the fundamentals of human 
existence. Luther’s is thus a daring view of Christ and the world. But it is hardly inconsistent, 
and probably as challenging today as it was five hundred years ago.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
form of the “speculative philosophy of Hegel.” 
